We design a new relay-aided secure transmission scheme, in which a source communicates with a destination through a trusted decode-and-forward relay in the presence of spatially random-distributed non-colluding eavesdroppers. We consider a general antenna configuration, in which the source, relay, destination, and eavesdroppers are equipped with multiple antennas. We assume that both the source and the relay transmit artificial noise signals in addition to information signals. We also assume that the source and the relay adopt different codebooks, and that the transmitted signals from the source and relay are not jointly processed at each eavesdropper. We first derive a closedform expression for the transmission outage probability and a new expression for the secrecy outage probability. Notably, these expressions are valid for an arbitrary number of antennas at the source, relay, and destination. We then derive simple yet valuable expressions for the asymptotic transmission outage probability and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability, which reveal the secrecy performance when the number of antennas at the source grows sufficiently large. Using our expressions, we quantify a practical performance metric, namely, the secrecy throughput, under a secrecy outage probability constraint. We further determine the system and channel parameters that maximize the secrecy throughput, leading to analytical security solutions suitable for real-world deployment.
techniques is achieved under the assumption of finite computational capability at the eavesdroppers. However, this assumption cannot be easily satisfied with the rapid and continuous growth of the computational capability of modern processors, which makes the traditional cryptographic techniques increasingly weak. Moreover, the ever-expanding size of decentralized wireless networks introduces significant challenges to key distribution and management. Against this backdrop, physical layer security has been proposed as a complementary technique to traditional cryptography, due to its benefits in enhancing the secrecy level of wireless communications by direct exploiting the randomness offered by wireless channels [1] , [2] . In seminal studies, e.g., [3] , it was established in a single-input single-output wiretap channel that secrecy can only exist when the wiretap channel between the source and the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the main channel between the source and the legitimate receiver. This result was later generalized to the case where the main channel and the wiretap channel are independent [4] .
Deploying multiple antennas at the source and/or the legitimate receiver has been shown to effectively boost the physical layer security of wiretap channels [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . The effectiveness of multiple antennas relies on the use of secure multi-input multi-output (MIMO) techniques, such as beamforming [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , artificial noise (AN) [10] [11] [12] [13] , and transmit antenna selection [14] [15] [16] [17] . In the MIMO setting, the presence of randomly distributed eavesdroppers has been recently investigated [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . In order to statistically characterize the secrecy performance of such scenarios, stochastic geometry and random geometric graphs are often used to model the locations of spatially random-distributed nodes. With such modeling, [18] investigated the throughput of largescale decentralized wireless networks with physical layer security constraints. Considering the path loss as the sole factor affecting the received signal-to-noise ratios at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, [19] examined the secrecy rate in cellular networks. In [20] and [21] , the secrecy rate achieved by linear precoding was analyzed for the broadcast channel and the cellular network, respectively. In [22] , the impact of AN was investigated in secure cognitive radio networks.
Apart from the aforementioned studies [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] which have examined physical layer security in point-to-point MIMO systems, the implementation of physical layer security in relay-aided networks has also drawn increasing attention [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] . This is due to the fact that wireless relaying has been recognized as an effective means to improve the coverage and reliability of mobile networks [33] , [34] . The studies on physical layer security in relay wiretap channels can be separated into two categories, namely, trusted relay [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] and untrusted relay [30] [31] [32] . Considering a trusted relay, various approaches can be used to enhance physical layer security such as cooperative beamforming [23] [24] [25] , relay selection [26] , [27] , and cooperative jamming [28] , [29] . Considering an untrusted relay, the secrecy may be compromised if the relay adopts the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol. To address this problem, [30] characterized the achievable secrecy rate in untrusted relay wiretap channels with the aid of noise-forwarding strategy at the relay. In [31] , the achievable secrecy rate was investigated in the general untrusted relay wiretap channels, showing that cooperation from the untrusted relay improves the secrecy performance. In [32] , the security of two-way untrusted relay wiretap channels was found to be enhanced if friendly jammers can be used. Despite the importance of [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] , a common limitation in these studies is that they only considered fixed eavesdropper locations. This leaves open the problem of designing relayaided secure transmission schemes for the scenario where the eavesdropper locations are spatially randomly distributed, e.g., in a large-scale wireless network.
In this work we design a new relay-aided secure transmission scheme for the relay wiretap channel. We clarify that, whilst it is well known a relay can aid communication reliability, the focus of this paper is the use of the relay in aiding security. In the relay wiretap channel, the communication between the source and the destination is aided by a trusted DF relay and overheard by multiple spatially randomdistributed eavesdroppers. We focus on the general scenario where the source, the relay, the destination, and the eavesdroppers are equipped with multiple antennas, which stands as a major advancement over the previous studies on securing the relay wiretap channel [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] . In order to confuse the eavesdroppers, we assume that the source transmits AN signals in the first hop and the second hop. We also assume that the relay transmits AN signals in addition to information signals in the second hop. 1 We assume that the source and the relay adopt different codebooks, and that the transmitted signals from the source and the transmitted signals from the relay are not jointly processed at each eavesdropper. The contributions made by this work are summarized as follows:
1) We derive a closed-form expression for the transmission outage probability and a new expression for the secrecy outage probability. Notably, these expressions require only the statistics of channels (i.e., mean and variance), and are independent of specific realizations of channels (i.e., instantaneous channel state information (CSI)). Moreover, these expressions are valid for an arbitrary number of antennas at the source, relay, 1 An initial study of a much simpler system model is given in [35] where the relay, the destination, and the eavesdroppers are all equipped with a single antenna and AN signals are transmitted by the source in the first hop only. This simplified system configuration allowed for analytical tractability at the expense of significant sub-optimality. and destination. These expressions also allow us to characterize the secrecy throughput of the considered relay wiretap channel. 2) We derive simple yet valuable expressions for the asymptotic transmission outage probability and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability. These expressions quantify the secrecy performance in the regime where the number of antennas at the source becomes sufficiently large. Based on our analysis, we find that the asymptotic transmission outage probability is determined by the average signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the relay-destination channel only. We also find that the asymptotic secrecy outage probability approaches a certain value which is independent of the number of antennas at the source. 3) Based on the derived expressions, we propose a new relay-aided secure transmission scheme, which maximizes the secrecy throughput of the considered relay wiretap channel under a secrecy outage probability constraint. The proposed secure transmission scheme works in the following fashion: i) The design of the precoders and the AN signals at the source and the relay and ii) the determination of the transmission parameters, i.e., the wiretap code rates and the power allocation factors, that maximizes the secrecy throughput. We highlight that the novelty of the proposed scheme lies in its generality, i.e, the proposed scheme achieves the maximum secrecy throughput of a wide range of relay wiretap channels, in which all nodes are equipped with multiple antennas, leading to analytical security solutions suitable for real-world deployment. Moreover, we evaluate the impact of the system parameters, e.g., the number of antennas at the source and the density of eavesdroppers, on the secrecy throughput. Beyond the above contributions, we provide some pivotal insights into the practical design of secure transmission. First, we show that the AN signals from the source play a more dominant role in securing the transmission in the considered relay wiretap channels than the AN signals from the relay. Second, we show that adding extra antennas at the source significantly increases the maximum secrecy throughput, but does not decrease the secrecy outage probability always. Third, we find that in order to achieve the maximum secrecy throughput, the source needs to allocate a higher power to AN signals whereas the relay needs to allocate a lower power to AN signals when the antenna number at the source increases. Fourth, we find that the maximum secrecy throughput increases when the eavesdroppers are more dispersed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the relay wiretap channel considered in the paper. In Section III, we derive expressions for the outage probabilities of the considered relay wiretap channel. The characterization and maximization of the secrecy throughput are also provided in Section III. Numerical results and related discussions are presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V draws conclusions.
Notations: Column vectors (matrices) are denoted by boldface lower (upper) case letters. Conjugate transpose is denoted by (·) H . Complex Gaussian distribution is denoted by CN . A zero matrix and an identity matrix of appropriate dimension are denoted by 0 and I, respectively. Statistical expectation is denoted by E. The modulus of a scalar is denoted by | · |. The Frobenius norm of a vector or a matrix is denoted by · . The maximum value and the minimum value of a set of elements are denoted by max (·) and min (·), respectively.
II. MULTI-ANTENNA RELAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
We consider a relay wiretap channel, as depicted in Fig. 1 , where a source (S) communicates with a destination (D) with the aid of a relay (R) in the presence of multiple spatially random eavesdroppers. The locations of the eavesdroppers are modeled as a homogeneous Poisson Point Process (PPP) with density λ [18]- [22] , which represents the case where the eavesdroppers are mobile users in a decentralized network [36] . We clarify that the source, the relay, and the destination do not belong to . In this channel, the source, the relay, the destination, and each eavesdropper are equipped with N s , N r , N d , and N e antennas, respectively. We denote H sr as the N r × N s channel matrix from the source to the relay and denote H rd as the N d × N r channel matrix from the relay to the destination. We consider that all the channels are subject to independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) Rayleigh fading. We also consider a quasi-static block fading environment in which all the channel coefficients remain the same within one time slot. We assume that the CSI between the source and the relay and the CSI between the relay and the destination are known at the source, while the CSI from the eavesdroppers is not known. We clarify that the source can obtain the CSI between the source and the relay and the CSI between the relay and the destination through feedback from the relay. For example, the destination feeds back the CSI between the relay and the destination to the relay, then the relay feeds back the CSI between the relay and the destination together with the CSI between the source and the relay to the source. As such, the CSI between the source and the relay and the CSI between the relay and the destination are known at the relay. The CSI between the relay and the destination is known at the destination. We also assume that N s > N e since the eavesdroppers are able to eliminate the AN if N s ≤ N e . This assumption is practical in scenarios where the source is a base station (BS) with a large number of antennas, while the eavesdroppers are mobile users with a limited number of antennas. As such, this assumption is widely adopted in existing studies of AN design, e.g., [10] [11] [12] [13] . We assume that the source, the relay, and the destination have known fixed locations. We also assume that the destination is located remotely from the source such that the destination cannot receive signals from the source directly. All the nodes operate in a half-duplex mode such that each node cannot transmit and receive simultaneously. We denote d sr and d rd as the sourcerelay distance and the relay-destination distance, respectively.
A. Transmission of Artificial Noise Signals
We now detail the transmission scheme between the source and the destination. In this scheme we assume that both the source and the relay transmit AN signals together with the information signals. This scheme utilizes two time slots. In the first time slot, the source transmits information signals and AN signals to the relay, referred to as the first hop transmission. We assume that the relay adopts maximum-ratio combining (MRC) [37] [38] [39] to process the received signals in order to maximize the received SINR. In the second time slot, the DF relay transmits the re-encoded signals and AN signals to the destination, referred to as the second hop transmission. We assume that the destination also adopts MRC to process the received signals. In the second time slot, it is assumed that the source transmits AN signals to further confuse the eavesdroppers. We clarify that the AN signals from the source in the second time slot has no impact on the quality of the received signals at the destination, due to the remote distance between the source and the destination. We also clarify that both the first hop transmission and the second hop transmission can be overheard by the eavesdroppers. We clarify that the transmission scheme can also be used for uplink transmission in scenarios where the source is a BS equipped with a large number of antennas and the eavesdroppers are mobile with a limited number of antennas. In that case, the source serves as a friendly jammer in the first time slot.
In the first hop transmission, the signal transmitted by the source is given by
where W 1 denotes the N s × N s beamforming matrix at the source and t 1 denotes the combination of the information signal and the AN signal at the source. To transmit x S , we first design W 1 as
where w S is used to transmit the information signal at the source and W SAN is used to transmit the AN signal at the source. The aim of W 1 is to degrade the quality of the received signals at the eavesdroppers. By transmitting AN signals through W 1 , together with the fact that the relay adopts MRC to process the received signals from the source, we ensure that the quality of the received signals at the relay is free from AN interference. In designing W 1 , we choose w S as the eigenvector corresponding to the largest non-zero eigenvalue of H H sr H sr , denoted by λ sr max . We then choose W SAN as the remaining N s − 1 eigenvectors of H H sr H sr . Such design ensures that W 1 is a unitary matrix. We then design t as
where t S denotes the information signal at the source and t SAN is an (N s − 1) × 1 vector of the AN signal at the source. We define β s , 0 < β s ≤ 1, as the fraction of the power allocated to the information signal at the source. As such, we (2) , and (3), the received signal at the relay in the first hop transmission is expressed as
where P s (in Watts) denotes the transmit power at the source, η denotes the path loss exponent, and n r denotes the thermal noise at the relay, the elements of which are assumed to be i.i.d complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance σ 2 r , i.e., n r ∼ CN 0 N r , σ 2 r I N r . We note that AN signals in (4) can be canceled at the relay by applying MRC.
We next express the received signal at the i -th eavesdropper located at ζ i , in the first hop transmission as
where H si denotes the N e × N s channel matrix from the source to the i -th eavesdropper, d si denotes the distance between the source and the i -th eavesdropper, and n i1 denotes the thermal noise vector at the i -th eavesdropper, the elements of which are assumed to be i.i.d complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance σ 2 i1 , i.e., n i1 ∼ CN 0 N e , σ 2 i1 I N e . In the second hop transmission, the DF relay first decodes the received signals from the source. If the received signals are successfully decoded, the relay retransmits the re-encoded signals and AN signals to the destination. The signals transmitted by the relay is given by
where W 2 denotes the N r × N r beamforming matrix at the relay and t 2 denotes the combination of the information signal and the AN signal at the relay. Similar to W 1 and t 1 , we design W 2 and t 2 as
and
respectively. In (7), w R is used to transmit the information signal at the relay and W RAN is used to transmit the AN signal at the relay. In designing W 2 , we choose w R as the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of H H rd H rd , denoted by λ rd max . We then choose W RAN as the remaining N r − 1 eigenvectors of H H rd H rd . This design ensures that the quality of the received signals at the destination is free from AN interference when the destination applies MRC to process the received signals. In (8) , t R denotes the information signal at the relay and t RAN is an (N r −1)×1 vector of the AN signals at the relay. We define β r , 0 < β r ≤ 1, as the fraction of the power allocated to the information signals at the relay. As such, we have E |t R | 2 = β r and E t RAN t H RAN = 1−β r N r −1 I N r −1 . According to (6), (7) , and (8), we express the received signal at the destination in the second hop transmission as
where P r (in Watts) denotes the transmit power at the relay and n d denotes the thermal noise at the destination, the elements of which are assumed to be i.i.d complex random variables with zero mean and variance σ 2
. We note that AN signals in (9) can also be canceled at the destination by applying MRC.
In order to further confuse the eavesdroppers in the second hop transmission, we assume that the source transmits AN signals using transmit power P s . We denote the AN signals from the source in the second hop transmission as x AN , the elements of which follow the i.i.d zero mean complex Gaussian distribution. We assume that x AN has unit power such that E x AN x H AN = I N s /N s . We next express the received signal in the second hop transmission at the i -th eavesdropper located at ζ i as y (2) 
where H ri denotes the N e × N r channel matrix from the relay to the the i -th eavesdropper, d ri denotes the distance between the relay and the i -th eavesdropper, and n i2 denotes the thermal noise vector at the i -th eavesdropper, the elements of which are assumed to be i.i.d complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance σ 2 i2 , i.e., n i2 ∼ CN 0 N e , σ 2 i2 I N e .
B. Formulation of Received SINRs
We first focus on the equivalent instantaneous SINR at the destination. Recall that both the relay and the destination apply MRC to process received signals. We express the MRC combiner at the relay in the first hop transmission as v r = λ rd max , respectively. As per the rules of the DF protocol, we express the equivalent end-to-end SINR from the source to the destination as [33] 
We now focus on the equivalent SINR at the eavesdroppers. In order to maximize the probability of successful eavesdropping, we assume that, instead of MRC, each eavesdropper utilizes the minimum mean square error (MMSE) combining to process the received signals within two time slots. This is because, in the presence of AN signals, MRC is suboptimal for maximizing the SINR at an eavesdropper compared to MMSE combining [40] . As per the rules of the MMSE combining, we express the instantaneous SINR at the i -th eavesdropper in the first hop transmission and the second hop transmission as
respectively, where
We assume that the eavesdroppers are non-colluding, indicating that each eavesdropper decodes her own received signals from the source and the relay without cooperating with other eavesdroppers. We assume that the source and the relay use different codebooks, and adopt a common assumption of physical layer security that the codebooks are available at each eavesdropper (e.g., [5] , [6] ). In the following, it will be useful to define the SINR E as
We note that (16) accommodates the case where an eavesdropper may be located close to the destination. In this case, the impact of the AN signals from the source on the quality of the received signals at that eavesdropper becomes negligible, while the quality of the received signals at the eavesdropper is still degraded by the AN signals from the relay.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance achieved by the transmission scheme detailed in Section II. We first derive a closed-form expression for the transmission outage probability and a new expression for the secrecy outage probability, both of which are valid for an arbitrary number of antennas at the source, relay, and destination. We then derive simple yet valuable expressions for the asymptotic transmission outage probability and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability, both of which are valid for a sufficiently large number of antennas at the source, i.e., N s → ∞. We further describe in detail how the secrecy throughput of the relay wiretap channel is quantified and how the maximum secrecy throughput is obtained under a secrecy outage probability constraint.
A. Preliminaries
In this subsection, we present the statistics of γ sr , γ rd , γ si , and γ ri , which will be used to derive the outage probabilities. We first focus on the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of γ sr and γ rd . To this end, we introduce several new notations as follows: N d ) , and t 2 = v 2 − u 2 . We then obtain the CDF of γ sr as [37] F γ sr (γ ) = det γ β s γ sr
where
In (18), γ (·) denotes the incomplete gamma function, defined as [41, eq. (8.352)]
for integer k, where (·) denotes the gamma function, defined
Similarly, we obtain the CDF of γ rd as
where γ β r γ rd is a u 2 × u 2 matrix with (i, j )th entry,
where g 2 (i, j ) = t 2 + i + j − 1, and γ rd = P r d −η rd σ −2 d . With the aid of [42] , we express the CDF of γ si as
, and express the CDF of γ ri as F γ ri (γ )
where γ ri = P r d −η ri σ −2 i2 , κ 2 = 1−β r β r (N r −1) , and κ 3 = 
B. Outage Probabilities
In this subsection, we define the transmission outage event and the secrecy outage event and then characterize their probabilities. We first denote C b (in bits/Hz/s) as the instantaneous capacity between the source and the destination. According to (11) , C b is given by
where the presence of the factor 1/2 is due to the fact that two time slots are used in the transmission. We also denote C e (in bits/Hz/s) as the instantaneous capacity between the source and the eavesdropper. According to (16) , C e is given by
We assume that the wiretap code is adopted in the transmission. We denote (R b , R e ) as the parameter pair for the adopted wiretap code, where R b denotes the transmission rate of the wiretap code, and R e denotes the redundancy rate of the wiretap code revealing the cost of preventing eavesdropping. We also assume that the source and the relay use the same (R b , R e ) to transmit, but with different codebooks. As such, we define that the transmission outage event occurs when C b < R b . In this event, the received signals at the destination are not reliably decoded. We also define that the secrecy outage event occurs when C e ≥ R e . In this event, the eavesdropper is able to decode the transmitted signals and secrecy is compromised.
Based on the definition of the transmission outage event, we define the transmission outage probability as the probability that the equivalent instantaneous SINR at the destination is less than τ b = 2 R b − 1. Mathematically, P to is formulated as
Using (11), (17) , and (21), we re-express the transmission outage probability in (27) as [43] 
Based on the definition of the secrecy outage event, we define the secrecy outage probability as the probability that E is larger than τ e = 2 R e − 1. Mathematically, P so is formulated as
According to (16) , (23) , and (24), we derive a new expression for the secrecy outage probability in the following theorem. Theorem 1: The secrecy outage probability of the relay wiretap channel is derived as
J 2 and J 3 are given by (32) and (33) , as shown at the bottom of this page, respectively, shown at the top of the page. In (32) and (33), we have ψ (θ ) = τ e σ 2 i2 β r P r d 2 sr + d 2 si − 2d sr d si cos θ η 2 . Proof: See Appendix. We find that Theorem 1 provides a new tool for efficiently evaluating the secrecy outage probability. Although J 2 and J 3 for general η cannot be obtained in closed-form, they can be calculated by applying the Gaussian quadrature (GQ) method [44] in a two dimensional plane. 
In order to provide more insights into the expression for the secrecy outage probability, we present the expression for the secrecy outage probability for the special case where N r = N d = N e = 1 in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The secrecy outage probability when N r = N d = N e = 1 is given bỹ
wherẽ
(37) Proof: Substituting N r = N d = N e = 1 into Theorem 1 yields the desired result.
Remark: With the simplified expressions for the secrecy outage probability in (34)-(37), we first see that 0 ≤ I 1 , I 2 ≤ 1 (see (23) for I 1 and (24) for I 2 , the summations in [·] become 1 when N e = 1). As such, we see thatJ 1 is larger thanJ 3 . This in turn shows explicitly that the secrecy outage probability decreases as β s decreases (recall that β s denotes the fraction of the power allocated to the information signal at the source). As we will discuss in section III-D, the secrecy throughput is not only a function of the secrecy outage probability but also a function of the secrecy rate.
C. Asymptotic Outage Probabilities
In this subsection, we examine the asymptotic behavior of the outage probabilities as N s → ∞. The obtained asymptotic results are particular valuable for large-scale MIMO systems where the source (or equivalently, the BS) is equipped with a sufficiently large number of antennas. We first present the expression for the asymptotic transmission outage probability in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: The asymptotic transmission outage probability when N s → ∞ is given by
. (38) Proof: We express the asymptotic transmission outage probability when N s → ∞ as
We note that
Substituting (40) into (39) yields the result. According to Corollary 2, we find that the asymptotic transmission outage probability is solely determined by γ rd when N s → ∞. This finding is due to the fact that γ sr → ∞ when N s → ∞. As such, we conclude that the probability that D is less than τ b when N s → ∞ is determined by the link quality of the relay-destination channel only.
We next present the asymptotic secrecy outage probability when N s → ∞ in the following corollary.
Corollary 3: The asymptotic secrecy outage probability when N s → ∞ is given by
J ∞ 2 and J ∞ 3 are given by (43) and (44), respectively, shown at the bottom of the next page.
Proof: We express the asymptotic secrecy outage probability when N s → ∞ as
We note that lim N s →∞
and lim N s →∞
We also note 
Substituting (46)-(49) into (45) yields (41) , which completes the proof. Similar to J 2 and J 3 in (32) and (33), respectively, J ∞ 2 and J ∞ 3 in (43) and (44), respectively, can be calculated utilizing the GQ method. According to Corollary 3, we find that the asymptotic secrecy outage probability approaches a certain value that is independent of N s when N s → ∞. This reveals that adding extra transmit antennas at the source does not always decrease the secrecy outage probability.
D. Secrecy Throughput
So far, we have derived the exact and the asymptotic transmission outage probability and secrecy outage probability of the considered relay wiretap channel. Our derived expressions are valid for given R b , R e , β s , and β r . A question then naturally arises: "How do we determine the optimal R * • b , R * • e , β * • s , β * • r that achieves the maximum secrecy performance of this relay wiretap channel, under a secrecy outage probability constraint?" Our answer to this question demonstrates the usefulness of our analytical expressions in a wider sense. It shows how the expressions can be embedded and utilized in a complex optimization problem, presenting a solution that can be determined in a much faster manner than would otherwise be possible. A concrete example of this usefulness in an operational sense, would be the dynamic and real-time determination of the optimal system parameter settings for a given secrecy performance metric.
To answer the question, we utilize our derived expressions directly to characterize the secrecy performance of the relay wiretap channel. We consider the metric termed the secrecy throughput. This performance metric quantifies the average confidential information rate when the source transmits. The secrecy throughput for the relay wiretap channel is given by [10] 
The maximization problem is accordingly formulated as
In the following, we describe in detail how the maximum secrecy throughput is obtained by judiciously selecting the transmission parameters. 2 To this end, we solve the maximization problem in (51) in two steps. First, we fix power allocation factors β s and β r , and choose the wiretap code rates pair, R * b , R * e , that maximizes the secrecy throughput. Accordingly, the maximum secrecy throughput achieved by R * b , R * e for given β s and β r is defined as T * s . Second, we choose the wiretap code rates as well as the power allocation factor, R * • b , R * • e , β * • s , β * • r , that jointly maximizes T s . The details of these two steps are presented as follows:
1) R * b , R * e for given β s and β r : The wiretap code rates pair, R * b , R * e , that maximizes T s for given β s and β r is determined as
Taking the first-order derivative of P so with respect to R e , we confirm that ∂ P so /∂ R e < 0, which indicates that P so monotonically decreases as R e increases. As such, the value of R * e satisfying (52b) is the value of R * e that satisfies the secrecy outage probability constraint, i.e., P so R * e = ϕ. We then confirm that ∂ P to /∂ R b > 0, which shows that P to monotonically increases as R e increases. As such, we note that T s → 0 as R b increases such that P to → 1. Defining R max b as the value of R b that satisfies P to (R b ) = 1, we rewrite (52) as
Although a closed-form solution for R * b , R * e is mathematically intractable, we are able to find the values of R * b , R * e in a numerical way.
2) R * • b , R * • e , β * • s , β * • r : The wiretap code rates and power allocation factors which jointly maximizes T s in (50),
Algorithm 
Using (28) We note that our expressions for the outage probabilities can also be implemented in other performance metrics. For example, we can utilize our expressions to characterize the average secrecy rate of the relay wiretap channels in the presence of spatially random eavesdroppers.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to validate our analysis of the outage probabilities. We also examine the impact of transmission parameters (e.g., R b , β s , β r ) and system parameters (e.g., N s and λ) on the secrecy throughput of the relay wiretap channel. Throughout this section we concentrate on the practical example of a highly shadowed urban area with η = 4. We first demonstrate the accuracy of the transmission outage probability and the secrecy outage probability using Monte Carlo simulations. In Fig. 2 , we plot P to versus τ b for different values of γ b with N s = 4, N r = 2, N d = 2, N e = 2, β s = β r = 0.5, λ = 0.01, and d sr = d rd = 10. In this figure, we consider γ sr = γ rd = γ b . We first see that the analytical curves, generated from (28) , precisely match the simulation points marked by red circles, which demonstrates the correctness of our expression for P to in (28) . Second, we see that P to increases monotonically as τ b increases for a given γ b . This reveals that the transmission outage probability increases when the transmission rate of the wiretap code increases. We further see that P to decreases as γ b increases for a given τ b . This reveals that the transmission outage probability reduces when the source and the relay use a higher power to transmit for a fixed τ b .
In Fig. 3 , we plot P so versus τ e for different values of γ e with N s = 4, N r = 2, N d = 2, N e = 2, and β s = β r = 0.5. In this figure we consider γ sr σ 2 r /σ 2 i1 = γ rd σ 2 d /σ 2 i2 = γ e . We see an excellent match between the analytical curves generated from (30) and the simulation points marked by red circles, demonstrating the correctness of our expression for P so in (30) . We then see that P so decreases monotonically as τ e increases for a given γ e , which shows that the secrecy outage probability decreases when the redundancy rate of the wiretap code increases. We further observe that P so increases as γ e increases. This is because P so is determined by γ e for a given τ e , and the eavesdroppers receive signals from both the source and the relay. It follows that increasing the transmit power at the source and the relay leads to an improved SINR at the eavesdroppers.
In the following, we examine the impact of the transmission parameters on the secrecy throughput that is characterized by the derived outage probabilities. We first examine the impact of R b on T s . In Fig. 4 , we plot T s versus R b for different values of N s with R * e and fixed N d , N e , β s , and β r . We first observe that there exists a unique R * b that maximizes T s for given β s and β r . We also observe that the maximum T s for given β s and β r , i.e., T * s , increases as N s increases. This shows that adding extra transmit antennas at the source significantly enhances the secrecy performance of the relay wiretap channel.
We next examine the impact of β s and β r on T * s . In Fig. 5 , we plot T * s versus β s for different values of N s with a fixed β r . For each point of T * s , we choose R * b , R * e that maximizes T s for the corresponding β s . We first observe that there exists a unique β * • s that maximizes T * s . We then observe that the maximum T * s for a fixed β r increases as N s increases. Furthermore, we observe that the value of β * • s slightly decreases as N s increases, which shows that in order to maintain the maximum secrecy throughput, the power allocated to AN signals at the source needs to be increased as the number of antennas at the source increases.
In Fig. 6 , we plot T * s versus β r for different values of N s with a fixed β s . Similar as Fig. 5 , for each point of T * s , we choose R * b , R * e that maximizes T s for the corresponding β r . First, we see a unique β * • r that maximizes T * s . Second, we see that the maximum T * s for a fixed β s increases as N s increases. Additionally, we note that the value of β * • r increases as N s increases, demonstrating that a lower power is needed to be allocated to AN signals at the relay in order to achieve the maximum secrecy throughput when the antenna number at the source increases.
Finally, we examine the impact of N s and λ on T • * s . In Fig. 7 , we plot T * • s versus N s for different values of λ. For each point of T * • s , we choose β * • s , β r , R * • b , R * • e that maximizes T s . We first observe that T * • s increases as N s increases. This observation is consistent with the observation in Fig. 4 . We then observe that T * • s decreases as λ increases. This is due to the fact that more eavesdroppers exist as λ increases. The increasing number of eavesdroppers increases the value of R * e that satisfies the secrecy constraint.
V. CONCLUSION
We designed a new secure transmission scheme that maximizes the secrecy throughput of the generalized relay wiretap channel in the presence of spatially random multi-antenna eavesdroppers. In the scheme we assumed that both the source and the relay transmit AN signals with information signals in order to confuse the eavesdroppers. Considering the use of the decode-and-forward relaying protocol, we first derived a closed-form expression for the transmission outage probability and a new expression for the secrecy outage probability. We then derived simple yet valuable expressions for the asymptotic transmission outage probability and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability when the number of antennas at the source becomes sufficiently large. Using our derived expressions, we characterized the secrecy throughput of the relay wiretap channel and then determined the transmission and system parameters that achieve the maximum secrecy throughput. Finally, we evaluated the impact of these parameters on the secrecy throughput.
APPENDIX PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to (16) , (23) , and (24), we re-express (29) 
In (55), the operation (a) can be justified by applying the probability generating functional (PGFL) for the PPP , given by [45] E
and by changing to polar coordinates. In order to proceed with our analysis we first derive J 1 as 
where in (b) we use u = d 2 si , in (c) we use t = Similarly, we derive J 2 as
